来源：雪球App，作者： 走窄门的佩奇，（https://xueqiu.com/7768097185/229917093）

摘要：

8月26日美联储主席鲍威尔在全球央行年会上进行了8分钟的发言，强调了美联储抗击通胀的决心。鲍威尔的鹰派的发言吓崩了股市，美国三大股指全线下跌。他到底说了啥？本文呈现了鲍威尔发言原文，并附上我的翻译和解读，帮助大家准备理解美联储的政策意图。

关于鲍威尔的发言，媒体上有诸多解读。对于一个投资者而言，独立思考能力至关重要，听再多别人的解读，都不如看一遍原文。我花了一个晚上的时间，将鲍威尔的发言进行了全文翻译，并附上简要解读，以飨读者。

本文格式：英文-中文-解读。英语基础好的的小伙伴可以直接看英文；我的解读会帮助大家补充一些背景知识，另外一方面则说出了我的理解。

Chair Jerome H. Powell August 26, 2022

美联储主席，杰罗姆·鲍威尔，2022年8月26日

Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today.

谢谢主持人，很荣幸在这里发言。

At past Jackson Hole conferences, I have discussed broad topics such as the ever-changing structure of the economy and the challenges of conducting monetary policy under high uncertainty. Today, my remarks will be shorter, my focus narrower, and my message more direct.

在去年的的Jackson Hole年会上，我曾就诸多问题发表观点，比如不断变化的经济结构，在高度不确定性的环境下实施货币政策的挑战。今天，我的发言将更加简明扼要，传达的讯息更加直接。

佩奇注：Jackson Hole是美国的一个度假胜地，每年都会举办全球央行年会，讨论经济政策和货币政策；今年是新冠疫情后，该会议重回线下；全世界的焦点都放在美联储主席的讲话上，因为他会传递美联储最新的货币政策取向。

The Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) overarching focus right now is to bring inflation back down to our 2 percent goal. Price stability is the responsibility of the Federal Reserve and serves as the bedrock of our economy. Without price stability, the economy does not work for anyone. In particular, without price stability, we will not achieve a sustained period of strong labor market conditions that benefit all. The burdens of high inflation fall heaviest on those who are least able to bear them.

联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）当前的头等大事就是控制通胀，让其回到2%的政策目标。物价稳定是美联储的职责所在，也是经济的基石。没有稳定的物价，经济不可能运转良好。尤为重要的是，没有稳定的物价，我们强劲的劳动力市场也无法持续，而强劲的劳动力市场将惠及每一个人。高通胀所带来的沉重负担是普通老百姓无法承受的。

佩奇注：联邦公开市场委员会 (The Federal Open Market Committee)，隶属于联邦储备系统，主要任务是决定美国货币政策，透过货币政策的调控，来达到经济增长及物价稳定两者间的平衡。联邦公开市场委员会由12名委员组成，7名联储委员和纽约联邦储备银行行长占8个席位，另外4个席位则由其余11家联邦储备银行的行长轮流担任。公开市场委员会决议和执行公开市场操作，是联储体系中最重要的部门，每年要开八次会议，每六周一次。该条注释内容来自百度百科。

Restoring price stability will take some time and requires using our tools forcefully to bring demand and supply into better balance. Reducing inflation is likely to require a sustained period of below-trend growth. Moreover, there will very likely be some softening of labor market conditions. While higher interest rates, slower growth, and softer labor market conditions will bring down inflation, they will also bring some pain to households and businesses. These are the unfortunate costs of reducing inflation. But a failure to restore price stability would mean far greater pain.

稳定物价将需要一些时间，这要求我们强有力地采取各种政策工具，让供求关系趋于平衡。控制通胀将不可避免地让经济减速，而且会拖累就业市场。利率上升、经济放缓、就业市场疲软会压低通胀，但这也会给普通家庭和企业带来痛苦。但这是我们控制通胀的不幸代价。如果我们现在无法遏制通胀，将来会面对更大的痛苦。

The U.S. economy is clearly slowing from the historically high growth rates of 2021, which reflected the reopening of the economy following the pandemic recession. While the latest economic data have been mixed, in my view our economy continues to show strong underlying momentum. The labor market is particularly strong, but it is clearly out of balance, with demand for workers substantially exceeding the supply of available workers. Inflation is running well above 2 percent, and high inflation has continued to spread through the economy. While the lower inflation readings for July are welcome, a single month's improvement falls far short of what the Committee will need to see before we are confident that inflation is moving down.

2021年美国经济从疫情中强劲复苏，而现在很显然，经济开始放缓。最新的经济数据喜忧参半，但在我看来，我们的经济依然展现了强劲的动能。就业市场尤其繁荣，但它显然是失衡的。对劳动力的需求超过了劳动力的供给。通胀运行在高位，远超2%，而且通胀继续向整个经济蔓延。7月份的通胀数据令人欣慰，但一个月的改善远远没有达美联储的目标，通胀并没有显著下行。

We are moving our policy stance purposefully to a level that will be sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent. At our most recent meeting in July, the FOMC raised the target range for the federal funds rate to 2.25 to 2.5 percent, which is in the Summary of Economic Projection's (SEP) range of estimates of where the federal funds rate is projected to settle in the longer run. In current circumstances, with inflation running far above 2 percent and the labor market extremely tight, estimates of longer-run neutral are not a place to stop or pause.

我们正在坚定地将我们的政策立场调整到一个足以遏制通胀的水平。7月份的议息会议上，联邦公开市场委员会将联邦基金利率目标区间提升至2.25%-2.5%，这是经济预测摘要（SEP）对联邦基金利率长期趋势的估算范围。但目前的情况是，通胀水平远远高于2%，就业市场十分繁荣，委员会成员对联邦基金利率的预测范围会提升。

佩奇注：鲍威尔的意思是长期的利率区间会超过2.5%。SEP的全称是经济预测摘要；联邦公开市场委员会成员每个季度都会公布对经济前景的预测，包括经济增长率、失业率、通胀水平，SEP就是预测的汇编；成员的预测结果往往会在其货币政策取向上有所体现，所以每一位成员的预测就显得尤为重要）

July's increase in the target range was the second 75 basis point increase in as many meetings, and I said then that another unusually large increase could be appropriate at our next meeting. We are now about halfway through the intermeeting period. Our decision at the September meeting will depend on the totality of the incoming data and the evolving outlook. At some point, as the stance of monetary policy tightens further, it likely will become appropriate to slow the pace of increases.

Restoring price stability will likely require maintaining a restrictive policy stance for some time. The historical record cautions strongly against prematurely loosening policy. Committee participants' most recent individual projections from the June SEP showed the median federal funds rate running slightly below 4 percent through the end of 2023. Participants will update their projections at the September meeting.

在7月份的会议上，我们将联邦基金利率提升了75个基点，我当时就说过，再来一次非常寻常的大幅加息也许是合适的。我们现在处在休会期间，9月份的加息幅度取决于即将到来的整体的经济数据，以及不断变化的经济前景。在某个时间段，当我们的货币政策进一步收紧之后，放慢加息步伐也许会变得合适。（暗示下一次加息幅度可能也是75个基点）

佩奇注：鲍威尔的意思是，9月份的加息幅度取决于8月份的经济数据，下一次加息75个基点也许是合适的，目前还不到放松货币政策的时候。

控制物价需要我们在一段时间内继续维持紧缩性货币政策。历史经验强烈告诫我们，不要过早放松货币政策。从6月份的经济预测摘（SEP）要来看，大家对联邦基金利率的预测，中位数稍低于4%。委员会成员将在9月份的会议上更新他们的预测。

佩奇注：鲍威尔的意思是，公开市场委员会中有一半以上的成员认为政策目标应该高于4%，意思是本次加息的终点可能会超过4%，远高于现在的目标区间。

Our monetary policy deliberations and decisions build on what we have learned about inflation dynamics both from the high and volatile inflation of the 1970s and 1980s, and from the low and stable inflation of the past quarter-century. In particular, we are drawing on three important lessons.

联储的货币政策考量和决策都建立在对历史研究的基础之上。20世纪70年代到80年代，物价高企，通胀极其不稳定；而过去的25年代，物价稳定、通胀水平很低。我们从中总结了三条宝贵的经验教训。

The first lesson is that central banks can and should take responsibility for delivering low and stable inflation. It may seem strange now that central bankers and others once needed convincing on these two fronts, but as former Chairman Ben Bernanke has shown, both propositions were widely questioned during the Great Inflation period.(1) Today, we regard these questions as settled. Our responsibility to deliver price stability is unconditional. It is true that the current high inflation is a global phenomenon, and that many economies around the world face inflation as high or higher than seen here in the United States. It is also true, in my view, that the current high inflation in the United States is the product of strong demand and constrained supply, and that the Fed's tools work principally on aggregate demand. None of this diminishes the Federal Reserve's responsibility to carry out our assigned task of achieving price stability. There is clearly a job to do in moderating demand to better align with supply. We are committed to doing that job.

第一条经验教训，中央银行有能力且理所应当承担起维持物价稳定的责任。在今天的人们看来，这是显而易见的，哪还需要什么理由。但是正如美联储前主席伯南克所言，在大萧条期间，人们可不这么认为。当时人们主张，央行既没有能力也不应该去控制物价。今天人们就这个问题达成了共识，控制物价是央行的责任，央行也有这个能力。美联储理所应当去维持物价的稳定。

诚然，现在全球都面临着高通胀，有许多经济体的通胀甚至比美国还要严重。我认为，当前的高通胀是供求失衡的产物，需求旺盛，但供给不足，而美联储的政策只能影响总需求。然而这些理由并不能免除美联储的责任，美联储有责任去抑制需求，以便让供求趋于平衡。我们也致力于履行好这一职责。

The second lesson is that the public's expectations about future inflation can play an important role in setting the path of inflation over time. Today, by many measures, longer-term inflation expectations appear to remain well anchored. That is broadly true of surveys of households, businesses, and forecasters, and of market-based measures as well. But that is not grounds for complacency, with inflation having run well above our goal for some time.

我们从历史中学习到的第二条经验是，公众对未来通胀的预期会进一步推高通胀。今天，从各种渠道的数据来看，人们普遍认为通胀将持续很长一段时间。普通家庭、企业家、经济预测者、劳动者都这么认为。高通胀已经维持相当长的一段时间，这并不值得骄傲。

If the public expects that inflation will remain low and stable over time, then, absent major shocks, it likely will. Unfortunately, the same is true of expectations of high and volatile inflation. During the 1970s, as inflation climbed, the anticipation of high inflation became entrenched in the economic decisionmaking of households and businesses. The more inflation rose, the more people came to expect it to remain high, and they built that belief into wage and pricing decisions. As former Chairman Paul Volcker put it at the height of the Great Inflation in 1979, "Inflation feeds in part on itself, so part of the job of returning to a more stable and more productive economy must be to break the grip of inflationary expectations."

如果人们预期通胀持续处于低位，并且如果没有大的冲击出现，通胀很有可能会继续维持在低位。不幸的是，如果人们认为高通胀将持续下去，那么对未来的预期就会兑现，通胀就更有可能发生。

上世纪70年代，通胀高企，家庭和企业的决策都建立在高通胀预期的基础之上。通胀越高，人们对通胀的预期也会越高，并根据这个预期来做各种决策，包括收入要求和定价。美联储前主席沃尔克在1979年就说道，通胀会自我强化，所以控制通胀的的工作之一就是打破人们的这种预期。

One useful insight into how actual inflation may affect expectations about its future path is based in the concept of "rational inattention." When inflation is persistently high, households and businesses must pay close attention and incorporate inflation into their economic decisions. When inflation is low and stable, they are freer to focus their attention elsewhere. Former Chairman Alan Greenspan put it this way: "For all practical purposes, price stability means that expected changes in the average price level are small enough and gradual enough that they do not materially enter business and household financial decisions."

真实发生的通胀会如何影响人们对未来通胀的预期？我们可以引入一个概念，“理性忽视”（rational inattention）。当通胀持续处在高位，普通家庭和企业在做决策时，一定会考虑到通胀。当物价稳定时，他们就会把注意力放到别的地方。美联储前主席格林斯潘说道，物价稳定意味着，物价的变化缓慢、渐进，无论家庭还是企业在做决策时，压根不用考虑物价变动。

Of course, inflation has just about everyone's attention right now, which highlights a particular risk today: The longer the current bout of high inflation continues, the greater the chance that expectations of higher inflation will become entrenched.

当然，现在每一个人都在关注通胀，而这会强化一种趋势：通胀持续时间越长，人们对通胀的预期也就更加根深蒂固。

That brings me to the third lesson, which is that we must keep at it until the job is done. History shows that the employment costs of bringing down inflation are likely to increase with delay, as high inflation becomes more entrenched in wage and price setting. The successful Volcker disinflation in the early 1980s followed multiple failed attempts to lower inflation over the previous 15 years. A lengthy period of very restrictive monetary policy was ultimately needed to stem the high inflation and start the process of getting inflation down to the low and stable levels that were the norm until the spring of last year. Our aim is to avoid that outcome by acting with resolve now.

我们从历史中所汲取的第三条经验是，控制通胀的措施越是迟疑，就业方面的代价就会越大。我们必须牢记这条经验。1980年代，在沃尔克成功遏制通胀之前15年，人们都未能解决通胀问题。迫不得已，美联储出台了一个持续时间很长的激进紧缩型的货币政策，用来应对通胀，这一措施最终带来了长达25年的物价稳定，直到新冠疫情的出现。我们竭力避免出台过于激烈的紧缩性货币政策，这就要求我们痛下决心采取措施遏制通胀。

佩奇注：鲍威尔的意思是，长痛不如短痛；如果现在不遏制通胀，将来只能采取更激进的措施。

These lessons are guiding us as we use our tools to bring inflation down. We are taking forceful and rapid steps to moderate demand so that it comes into better alignment with supply, and to keep inflation expectations anchored. We will keep at it until we are confident the job is done.

这三条经验教训将指导我们运用各种工具去遏制通胀。我们正在坚定快速地采取有效措施，抑制需求，从而使供求区域平衡，改善人们的通胀预期。我们坚定执行这一政策，直至目标达成。

1. See Ben Bernanke (2004), "The Great Moderation," speech delivered at the meetings of the Eastern Economic Association, Washington, February 20; Ben Bernanke (2022), "Inflation Isn't Going to Bring Back the 1970s," New York Times, June 14. Return to text

2. See Paul A. Volcker (1979), "Statement before the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, October 17, 1979," Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 65 (November), p. 888. Return to text

3. A review of the applications of rational inattention in monetary economics appears in Christopher A. Sims (2010), "Rational Inattention and Monetary Economics," in Benjamin M. Friedman and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook of Monetary Economics, vol. 3 (Amsterdam: North-Holland), pp. 155–81. Return to text

4. See Alan Greenspan (1989), "Statement before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, February 21, 1989," Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 75 (April), pp. 274–75. Return to text

Last Update: August 26, 2022